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In competition policies, the notion of market power is a fundamental category. 
Practically the majority of market competition law regulations focus on this; there-
fore, its measurement is of paramount importance (Bishop–Walker [2010]). 
Several ways exist in which market power can be defined and understood. Here 
we use the definition of market power as the capability of companies to sustain their 
prices for prolonged periods of time above the competition (Bishop–Walker [2010]). 
Hence this phenomenon is interpreted in relation to effective competition, whose 
measurement is again not trivial.   
Market power may demonstrate itself in a number of ways, wherever the need for 
its statistical quantification emerges. This article considers a few of the key indica-
tors, focusing on their measurement and problems of interpretation from an eco-
nomic perspective. 
The phenomena examined and their measurements are: 1. market shares and the 
extent of concentration; 2. the general market power measuring figure, the so-called 
Lerner index, the capability of raising price above the marginal cost. 
Prior to studying these two areas in depth, it is worth mentioning and linking two 
(statistically measurable) elements. Market power partially emerged from monopo-
listic or oligopolistic market competition, that is, a monopoly has the ability to sus-
tain high prices over a prolonged period of time. Measurement and discussion of 
market domination abuse is therefore linked to the number of companies functioning 
on the market and their absolute and relative concentration. At the same time, a fairly 
small number of competitors are able to generate tense competition, making raising 
prices improbable. (A classical example is the case of Coca Cola’s and Pepsi Cola’s 
competition, but the tight race that evolved on the mobile telephone market at a rela-
tively small number of competitors is far less likely to occur on the landline market.) 
The latter is clearly linked with the naturally monopolistic setup of providing such 
service, but this article does not cover this area (Sugár [2011b]). Thus, one element 
of market domination is monopoly, the degree of concentration that limits competi-
tion from the supply side (Stigler [1964]). 
Market domination abuse has its prerequisites or provoking factors on the de-
mand side as well. A (nonexhaustive) list of these includes: 1. lack of information 
and general behavioural inflexibility of consumers; 2. rendering a supplier or a ser-
vice provider switch more difficult using administrative tools and withholding in-
formation; and 3. inelasticity of demand on the short and longer term. 
Lack of information of consumers or their failure to follow information closely 
is not the area of classical economics, rather that of behavioural economics. Espe-
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cially in the service sectors, many consumers are unaware that more favourable 
conditions are available and therefore fail to make use of the advantages of a 
switch. (An employee of a mobile operator company recently leaked verbally that 
several clients have not changed their packages over the past 10-14 years, paying 
approximately four times than a modern package’s price that contains the same 
services.) Price inelasticity of demand (often linked with the aforementioned fac-
tor) may also cause consumer inflexibility to change. The more inelastic the de-
mand, the less likely the consumers are to switch service providers.  A good exam-
ple of this is that however there is tight competition on the food market and a large 
number of gas or electricity utility is made available by the service providers, prac-
tically no switches took place in the residential sector in the past years (especially 
on the electricity market). In contrast to compulsory third party insurance, where 
price elasticity is far more significant and the consumers are also better informed 
and transaction costs are lower. 
Perhaps the oldest field with the most information available is the measurement 
of market shares and concentration, even though it may not be the most successful 
method. Several textbooks, studies and case studies have been committed to this top-
ic and it forms part of standard microeconomics and statistics curricula as well. The 
notions of absolute and relative concentration also belong here, for example the un-
even distribution of the number of competing vendors and market shares. (See Hun-
yadi–Vita [2008] or in more detail on the specific indicators Kotz–Johnson [1982–
1988].) 
The simplest indicators of the measurement of absolute and relative concentra-
tion are the number of market actors and the concentration quotient (the per cent of 
revenue shared by the largest player on the market) and the Hirschmann–
Herfindahl index (hereinafter referred to as HHI). These are in general use when 
studying competition policies too. (Another favoured tool of social sciences is the 
Lorenz curve, to which this article does not extend, as it is not widespread in com-
petition analyses.) 
The HHI index is the weighted average of the relative frequencies multiplied with 
themselves: 
2
iHHI z= ∑ , 
where zi is the relative frequency (assuming individual data are available).   
It is well-known that the lower limit of the HHI index is 1/n, which is the actual 
value of the index if and only if the population is distributed evenly and its upper 
limit is 1 with a single market player whose amount is not 0. In practice, when in-
stead of the relative values being squared, they are first multiplied by 100 and then 
ANDRÁS SUGÁR 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 16 
70 
the upper limit of the HHI will be 10 000. Many competition regulation authorities 
use this order of magnitude (which is naturally equivalent to the relative value). 
Based on the practice of the recent decades (for example in the case of the European 
or American authorities), some indicative values have also developed. The range of 
1 500–2 500 is not dangerous, but above 2 500 the concentration is said to be signifi-
cant (DoJ – FTC [2010]). 
Two remarks are worth making in consideration with the usage of the HHI index 
for practical competition policy applications. 
Markets with a different number of actors may be compared or the number of ac-
tors may change due to the integration or the separation of companies. In this case, 
the lower limit of the HHI index depends on the number of elements (market actors). 
Although in practice generally a few market actors are considered at a time, this may 
still cause a comparison problem. One option to resolve this is to transform the indi-
cator to be between 0 and 1, by calculating: 
1
1 1
HHI nHHI*
n
−= − , 
where HHI* is the transformed indicator whose value will fall between 0 and 1.  
This may have practical consequences even in the case of a small number of mar-
ket actors. Residential consumers in Hungary may purchase electricity from a choice 
of six service providers in the 2010s (the so-called universal service providers). 
In 2010, the electricity provided by the universal service providers to the con-
sumers was as shown in the table below: 
Table 1 
The distribution of electricity per service provider  
Electricity providers Distribution (percent) 
ELMŰ  28.8 
DÉMÁSZ 13.7 
E.ON Dél-dunántúli Áramszolgáltató Zrt. 13.3 
E.ON Észak-dunántúli Áramszolgáltató Zrt. (ÉDÁSZ) 17.7 
E.ON Tiszántúli Áramszolgáltató Zrt. 14.1 
ÉMÁSZ 12.4 
Total 100.0 
Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
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HHI index in this case is 0.171 or 1 710. The largest provider is ELMŰ (Buda-
pest), followed by ÉDÁSZ, but apart from ELMŰ as market leader, the rest of the 
distribution can be said to be fairly even. Considering, however, that there are only 
three proprietor actors on the market (ELMŰ and ÉMÁSZ are property of RWE), 
E.ON is the market leader with a share of 45.2 percent in the case of these three ser-
vice provider groups. The value of the HHI index is 0.384 or 3840, which at first 
sight shows a considerably greater level of concentration, but it may be misleading, 
as the theoretical lower limits are 0.167 in the first case and 0.333 in the second. 
Transforming the HHI index as shown formerly, for six service providers 
HHI* = 0.005, and for the three owners HHI* = 0.076. While it is difficult to judge 
the relative concentration for the first indicator due to the uncertainty of the lower 
limit, the adjusted index clearly shows that the relative concentration due to the pro-
prietorship background is considerably higher.  
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned transformation of the HHI index is 
often disputed in practice; in this case, the HHI only measures relative concentration, 
while in its original form the smaller number of actors (increasing the value of the 
indicator) considers the extent of absolute concentration as well. Because of this, the 
untransformed version of the index is in more general use. Based on the former data, 
the concentration is acceptable on the market of the six providers, but alarming for 
the three owners that may play a key role in abuse of market domination.  
The values of all the parameters describing the economic phenomena for all the 
market actors are often not known (for example total revenues) only those of the 
more significant ones. This case is not covered by the textbooks, but often emerges 
in competition law practice. 
Let us consider, for instance the market for large power stations in Hungary (of 
capacities greater than 50 MW). Seventeen such power stations operated in Hungary 
in 2011. The following table shows some of their key data. 
Table 2 
Data of large-scale power stations in 2011 
Power station Net capacity (MW) 
Net released electrical energy 
(GWh) 
Utilisation rate  
(percent) 
1. Paks Nuclear Power Station  1 892 14 741.3 88.9 
2. Dunamenti Power Station 1 869 1 501.7 9.2 
3. Mátra Power Station 849 5 762.2 77.5 
4. Tisza II  Power Station 864 1 158.8 15.3 
5. Gönyű  Power Station 425 995.0 26.7 
6. Csepel Power Station 403 1 831.4 51.9 
(Contiued on the next page.) 
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(Contunuation.) 
Power station Net capacity (MW) 
Net released electrical energy 
(GWh) 
Utilisation rate  
(percent) 
7. Oroszlány Power Station 224 858.6 43.8 
8. Tiszapalkonya Power Station 172 9.9 0.7 
9. Kelenföld Power Station 190 422.0 25.4 
10. Borsod Power Station 116 78.7 7.7 
11. Pannon Thermal Power Station 122 47.0 4.4 
12. Bakonyi GT Power Station 113 10.4 1.0 
13. Kispest Power Station 108 377.0 40.0 
14. Újpest Power Station 106 389.0 42.1 
15. Ajka Power Station 88 35.3 4.6 
16. DKCE Power Station 93 304.2 37.3 
17. ISD Power Station 58 88.5 17.4 
Total 7 692 28 611.0 42.5 
Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
For these large power stations, the extent of concentration is shown by Figure 1 
prepared based on the concentration ratios and the HHI index.  
Figure 1. Concentration ratios of net capacity and production 
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cant. The main reason for this is that the utilisations of the respective small power 
stations are different from those of the two large ones standing out by far (Paks and 
Mátra, as these are the cheapest in Hungary at the moment). 
Going back to the question of not having sufficient data, it is known that besides 
the seventeen large power stations, several hundreds of small ones are in operation 
(generally in linked generation, that is, focusing on selling thermal energy). In 2011, 
these accounted for 6 percent of the total electricity generated, not influencing sig-
nificantly the large power stations’ market, but their values could not be taken into 
consideration anyway as their individual generation volumes are not available. (Data 
provision liability to the Hungarian Energy Office is only in force for power stations 
with a generation capacity exceeding 50MW.) These small power stations lag behind 
the large ones by far in terms of capacity as well as actual generation.  
If we wish to take these power stations into consideration upon estimating the 
HHI index, then the market shares and the HHI indices must be recalculated as a first 
step. In the case of the electricity released, the HHI index decreases to 0.28 but the 
calculated index only concerns the seventeen large power stations covering 94 per-
cent of the market.  
It is known that the market share of the largest power station that follows is 
below 0.033 percent. (This is also the market share of the Tiszapalkonya Power 
Station among the seventeen large stations.) Based on this, the number of small 
power stations is at least 6/0.033, that is, a minimum of 182 small power stations 
(there is more in reality, but the estimation can be used even if their real number 
is not known). The value of the HHI index is a maximum at the value of 0.28, be-
ing 182 · 0.000332 = 0.00002, in other words, there is only an insignificant in-
crease. 
A similarly well-known property is that the HHI index of concentration can be di-
rectly correlated to distribution as the more the individual values are distributed, the 
less the extent of concentration. Formally, the following relation holds: 
2 1VHHI
n
+= ∑ , 
where V is relative distribution. This expression is only included here for complete-
ness’ sake; its only relevance in competition analysis being that individual data does 
not seem to be available at first sight, only the figures for average and distribution. In 
these cases, however, HHI can be calculated indirectly, further request and analysis 
of data therefore needs consideration. 
Competition analyses widely use another indicator, measuring market power with 
an entirely different logic: the so-called Lerner index. (See the original definition in 
Lerner [1934] and more on its application in Bishop–Walker [2010].) 
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The Lerner index measures the market power of a particular firm by determining 
its relative margin, that is, the capability of the company to raise its selling price 
above the marginal cost. The index is defined as: 
P MCL
P
−= , 
where P is the price defined by the company and MC is the marginal cost. If the 
company is aiming at maximising its profit, then marginal cost equals marginal reve-
nue (MR). In this case, it can be shown that the Lerner index is inversely proportional 
to the own price elasticity. 
( ) 11 1
ε
d PQ dP QdQMR P Q P P
dQ dQ PdQ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = + = + = +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
using the MR = MC equality: 
1 11
ε ε
P MCMC P L
P
− −⎛ ⎞= + → = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
in other words, the Lerner index is obtained as the inverse of the own price elasticity 
multiplied by –1.  
Theoretically, this is a well-established indicator to measure the abuse of market 
domination. As it was mentioned earlier, its value shows the extent to which a com-
pany is able to maintain its selling price above the marginal cost, which is increas-
ingly a potential possibility as the price elasticity of the company’s product de-
creases, that is, the less responsive the consumers are to changes in the selling price.  
At this point, it is worth clarifying that although the phenomenon of concentration 
and the capability to raise prices are both sources of market domination abuse, they 
do not necessarily occur simultaneously. As the two measurement logics introduced 
formerly show, concentration may result in market advantage in a monopolistic mar-
ket: a small number of actors may exploit the market due to the possible lack of 
competition. The price raising capability measured by the Lerner index may only oc-
cur if the price elasticity of the product is low, and if this is the case, then a number 
of companies may abuse the market through domination. The two phenomena often 
occur together, naturally, but this is not a prerequisite.  To illustrate this, it is worth 
considering the following four cases: 
a) High concentration of the market with a low price elasticity of 
the product: The market can be abused according to both perspectives. 
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This is typically the case with the naturally monopolistic public utility 
sector (electricity, gas, water, canalisation, district heating, etc.). It is 
no coincidence that there is local government intervention, or that the 
price is limited by the authorities, or that a price control is in force in 
this sector. 
b) Low concentration of the market with a high price elasticity of 
the product: This is the case when no market domination abuse is ex-
pected. Examples are foods sold in the retail sector and general house-
hold items.  
c) High concentration of the market with a high price elasticity 
of the product: Due to the small number of service providers, mar-
ket domination abuse is theoretically possible but the high price 
elasticity of the product causes tough competition still. Examples 
generally quoted are mobile operators or compulsory third party car 
insurance. Naturally, the condition of the formation of market com-
petition is the possibility of simple and easy service provider 
switch. (The case of banking services would be similar, but this lat-
ter condition is not available as changing a bank is difficult and 
costly). 
d) Low concentration of the market with a low price elasticity of 
the product: In this case, the consumers have a proper range of sup-
pliers to choose from, but market abuse is still possible due to the 
low price elasticity of the product. This is the least probable case as 
the ease of switching a supplier or vendor limits raising the selling 
price. Although the price of bread is inelastic, it is still difficult to 
keep prices high due to intense competition. Examples also exist in 
the energy sector; the non-residential consumers in the electricity and 
gas sectors are characterised by this. As of 2008, they are only able 
to purchase electricity from the free market. The price elasticity of 
their demand is low (we have conducted several surveys over the 
past years, based on which the demand price elasticity of electricity 
from small businesses on the short run is about –0.3 – –0.4). Because 
of this, although several suppliers offer electricity to them, supplier 
switches are marginal in volume. Market domination abuse has prob-
ably evolved as a result. After liberating the market, price control by 
the authorities remained in control in the residential sector, while 
large companies were in a better negotiating position than large con-
sumers. The suppliers attempted to compensate the profit thus fore-
gone from the small businesses sector, resulting even in price hikes 
of 30-40 percent in 2008. 
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Returning to the basic topic of this article, to the indicators, the Lerner index rais-
es problems in practice as well as theory. The following theoretical problems emerge 
upon its application:  
a) The marginal cost is usually an ineffective method of pricing. In 
a number of industrial fields, the price contains the return of the in-
vestment cost (fixed cost) and the capital cost. 
b) The Lerner index can only be used effectively for single product 
companies, where the particular costs cannot be cross-loaded to other 
products.  (See the distorting effect of multiple product cases in Ap-
pendix 3.1 of Bishop–Walker [2010]). 
Computing the Lerner index  
The theoretical considerations are not particularly relevant concerning the elec-
tricity generation described in the article. The power stations are indeed homogene-
ous producers of a single product (electricity) and theoretically the selling price may 
be close to the marginal cost as many of them are obsolete, write-off power stations 
not capable of generating capital cost significantly in the tough competitive (primar-
ily import influenced) market situation. (As a result of this, a number of power sta-
tions have ceased operations, such as Tisza II and several blocks of Dunamenti 
Power Station.)  
If we wish to quantify the Lerner index, it can be done from the cost-price side. 
The marginal cost per power station and the actual prices need to be known, but 
presently this information is unavailable. In practice, this latter (cost-price side) prin-
ciple is generally followed, resulting in the price inelasticity of demand. As in this 
case it is not possible to take this option, the index is approached from the other side.  
To estimate the price elasticity, time series methods were used at first. The non-
residential electricity sector has been fully liberalised since 2008. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the average price at the power stations and their supply (assuming that 
this is the sector that purchases the most on free market basis) between 2008 and 
2011, based on monthly data.  
The data have been seasonally adjusted applying the TRAMO_SEATS method. 
Using both the original and the seasonally adjusted data, calculating in the case of 
time series with the Cochrane-Orcutt algorithm, the price elasticity of demand is 
positive, which contradicts economic rationale. 
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Figure 2. Average price and supply of electricity between 2008 and 2011 
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Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
The fundamental reason for this is that there is a reversed correlation between 
price and demand, it is not the demand that determines the selling price, but it is 
the price that depends on the size of demand (and in the case of a special product 
such as electricity, it depends on the size of supply). This has also been examined 
with the Granger causality test, which proved our hypothesis. The smaller the de-
mand to satisfy, the lower the average price, higher prices may be realised in the 
peak consumption periods. (This is the main reason why the price is often around 
the marginal cost as the occasionally occurring high demands at peak consumption 
periods allow for high profits. This correlation demonstrates itself most clearly in 
stock market prices). 
We also attempted to estimate the price elasticity of demand using power station 
data from 2011. Although the individual power station prices were not known, we 
knew that they sold electricity at an average price of 16.9 HUF/kWh in 2011. As-
suming that price is proportional to the utilisation rate of the power station, and in 
this case Paks sells electricity at an average price of 8 HUF/kWh, with Mátra Power 
Station at 9 HUF/kWh which more or less correspond to the actual prices. The prices 
thus obtained and the corresponding quantities were used to establish a simple expo-
nential regression function. The XY figure (scatterplot) and the estimated function 
are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of prices and demand and the regression curve 
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It can be seen that the price elasticity of demand is –1.2; in other words, a price 
change of 1 percent will generate an average change of 1.2 percent of demand in the 
opposite direction. The modulus of price elasticity is above 1, that is, the demand can 
generally be said to be price elastic albeit not significantly.    
The Lerner index based on the above is 0.8: the market price may be as high as 
fivefold the marginal cost.    
Alternative calculations of HHI and Lerner index 
Both the HHI index and the Lerner index demonstrate a possibility of consider-
able market domination abuse in the electricity generation sector in Hungary.   
This result is in coherence with the economic situation of large power stations 
having a strong absolute concentration in the area of generation capacities and the 
relative concentration is also significant, while in the area of generation, the degree 
of concentration is even higher due to the greatly varying capacity utilisations. (This 
very difference of capacity utilisation that shows that power stations sell energy at a 
wide range of prices, being forced to match it to their costs. It provides room for de-
ducing the prices from the capacity utilisation, which match other information as 
  0.0                        20.0                      40.0                       60.0                      80.0                      100.0 
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well.) The demand price elasticity of power station generation was estimated and this 
gave a clue to estimate the magnitude of the Lerner index, which again showed that 
power stations are indeed able to abuse their market domination, establishing their 
prices well above the marginal cost.   
Still, the scenario described is somewhat contradictory to the general pricing 
practice followed by power stations in Hungary. The prices – according to this sce-
nario – follow the marginal costs; there are explicitly “cheap” power stations where 
the marginal cost is lower: these are typically the large power stations with the ca-
pacity to abuse their market positions and there are smaller and technologically less 
advanced large power stations who sell more expensively. The generally tough mar-
ket competition is often quoted as an explanation to this, principally fuelled by en-
ergy imports. This indicates that the role of imports cannot be neglected when evalu-
ating the possibilities of market domination abuse.  
The interpretation and the incorporation of imports into the measurement as a fac-
tor strengthening or diluting concentration raise a number of methodological and 
economic questions.   
a) There are branches where imports emerge as a true monopoly. 
Such is the natural gas sector, where 86 percent of consumption is im-
port based with the vast majority entering the country within the 
framework of E.ON Trade’s long-term contract established in 1996 
(back then between MOL and Gazprom). Although other sources of 
procurement are available (MOL, Tigáz, and previously Emfesz), be-
cause of this, the Hungarian Energy Office rated E.ON Trade on the 
wholesale market as a supplier with great market power, due to its de-
finitive 55 percent market share (as a thumb rule, this rating is auto-
matically achieved at 40 percent of the market share). As the importing 
company dictates the prices (greatly influenced by the long-term con-
tract’s prices, naturally), import here is typically a factor increasing 
market domination. This is probably the cause of Hungarian gas prices 
being higher than the European average and that E.ON maintains a 
particularly strong negotiation position against the state of Hungary as 
a regulatory authority.  
b) In certain branches there is no import competition at all, mostly 
where transportation costs render this impossible. Such are basic build-
ing materials, diesel, or petrol. In the case of the latter, some petroleum 
derivatives from abroad do enter certain regions of the country, but 
their share does not exceed 20 percent. Therefore, on the wholesale 
market of fuels, MOL could have absolute market domination with its 
80 percent share and its capacity to raise prices could also be signifi-
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cant. The increasing price elasticity of the demand for fuels supports 
this scenario. However, none of the competition authority checks man-
aged to put MOL in the wrong (to date) for its pricing practices, the 
main reason being that MOL’s pricing is not cost based – meaning that 
Lerner index supported examinations are meaningless in this case – is 
linked instead to Mediterranean and Rotterdam index prices, that is, to 
global trends and changing exchange rates, whose correct nature has 
not been called into question with success so far. (See more detail in 
Sugár [2011a].) 
c) There are examples placed between the two extremes mentioned 
before, such is the market for electricity. The share of imports fluctu-
ates between 15 and 20 percent, neither definitive nor significant.  
Figure 4. Production and import of electricity between 2010 and 2011  
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Source: Hungarian Energy Office. 
Imports may be managed upon modelling and measurements by (and this often is 
the practice) that import volume is considered a separate power station. Imported 
electricity comes to Hungary mainly from Slovakia and Romania and in smaller 
quantities from Austria; the main reason being its low price. (Besides Slovakian and 
Ukrainian electricity, the price of Polish and Czech electricity is also lower.) The 
import quantity is limited by the boundary capacity (which has to be bidden for sepa-
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rately). Another option would be the consideration of the imports from each neigh-
bouring country as a power station separately, but data are not available in such 
breakdown. One solution (which we have opted for too) is to separate the import 
volume into two parts, the cheaper but greater volume season (summer) and the more 
expensive but lower volume (winter) season: the periods from April to September 
and from October to March. (Examples of regional modelling are also available 
(Kiss–Barquín–Vázquez [2006].) 
The other factor significantly influencing monopolistic situations is that Hungar-
ian regulations (in conformity with the European ones) consider companies in mo-
nopolistic positions with those in significant market power (as mentioned already in 
the case of natural gas) and brings about monopoly resolving decisions in conse-
quence.   
The Hungarian Energy Office has brought about four resolutions establishing 
significant market power (SMP), of which two – concerning the wholesale and the 
system level service markets – were issued in the summer of 2008 and two further 
ones concerning the retail market in the spring of 2009. The last SMP resolution was 
issued in November 2011. The wholesale SMP resolution has obliged Hungarian 
Electricity Company (MVM) as a company of significant market power to carry out 
the following:  
a) Based on the corresponding legal regulations, the company 
has to auction a quantity of electricity from the quantity available to 
reduce its market share calculated without electricity below 40 per-
cent.  
b) Besides the establishment of the auctioning obligation, the SMP 
resolution also established maximum prices concerning electricity 
sales by MVM. The Office established the company’s maximum sell-
ing price in 2009 as 19.05 HUF/kWh. The resolution of 2011 deleted 
this point considering MVM’s decreasing market power and the level 
of prices that formed. 
In order to interpret the resolution properly, it must be understood that MVM 
fixed a significant part of the capacity of the Hungarian power stations earlier with 
long-term contracts. Although these contracts had to be broken as a result of EU ex-
aminations, the subsequent replacement contracts were also made between MVM 
and the large powers stations mostly. MVM definitively ties down the production 
capacity of Paks Nuclear Power Station and Mátra Power Station. As the resolution 
of the Hungarian Energy Office shows, MVM is obliged to sell part of this capacity 
in auctions, this quantity also having an effect on the extent of market concentration. 
The consideration of this is ambiguous. In our case, we chose the solution whereby 
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the larger quantities auctioned off in 2011 and their prices were considered a com-
petitive power plant package. The capacities of Paks and Mátra power stations were 
decreased proportionally by these quantities. 
By considering all these, the new (fictitiously prepared) power station portfolio is 
as shown by Table 3. 
Table 3 
 Corrected data of large power stations, auctions and imported volumes in 2011  
Power station Electricity sold  (GWh) 
Electricity sold  
(percent) 
Estimated average price 
(HUF/kWh) 
Paks Nuclear Power Station 9 287 25.86 8.0 
Summer imports 4 356 12.13 14.2 
Mátra Power Station 3 630 10.11 9.2 
1st auction 2 500 6.96 13.9 
2nd auction 2 500 6.96 13.4 
Winter imports 2 439 6.79 15.7 
3rd auction 2 200 6.13 14.8 
Csepel Power Station 1 831 5.10 13.7 
Dunamenti Power Station 1 502 4.18 77.4 
Tisza II.  Power Station 1 159 3.23 46.4 
4th auction 1 000 2.78 18.8 
Gönyű Power Station 995 2.77 26.6 
Oroszlány Power Station 857 2.39 16.2 
Kelenföld Power Station 422 1.17 28.0 
Újpest Power Station 389 1.08 16.9 
Kispest Power Station 377 1.05 17.7 
DKCE Power Station 304 0.84 19.0 
ISD Power Station 89 0.25 40.7 
Borsod Power Station 79 0.22 91.6 
Total of large power stations 35 916 100.00 16.8 
The data thus modified alter the values of both indicators significantly. The HHI 
index decreases greatly, from the initially calculated 0.32 down to 0.07, indicating 
that the extent of concentration is not significant if import volumes and auctions are 
taken into consideration. 
Estimating the value of the elasticity coefficient we obtain a value of –1.7, that is, 
the price elasticity is greater, a 1 percent change in price will result in a change of 1.7 
percent of demand in the opposite direction as indicated in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Scatterplot of prices and demand and the regression curve 
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The –1.7 percent price elasticity corresponds to a Lerner index of 0.6, showing a 
far smaller potential to abuse the market; the price may exceed the marginal cost by 
67 percent. Naturally this is not an insignificant value, but far smaller than the poten-
tial to raise the prices fivefold to that of the marginal cost before the introduction of 
the corrective measures.  
The correction of the import volumes and the auctions therefore yielded the re-
sults whereby market concentration was not significant on the source side of the 
electricity generated (imported or auctioned) and the Lerner index indicated a far 
weaker power to raise prices. This means that the obstruction of the development of 
abusive market power can be efficiently achieved by both the intensification of com-
petition (imports) and administrative measures (auctions) at least based on the statis-
tical figures available.  
Finally, it must be remarked that the uncorrected data that indicated the possibil-
ity of market domination abuse may be misleading, as they do not present the supply 
of power stations in pure market conditions, but beside the presence of a company, 
MVM that has dominated the market for decades. MVM determined fully the quan-
tity and the price of electricity taken over in the past and still influences it today. A 
perfectly clear picture would be available if the power stations were selling closer to 
pure market conditions without the presence of a dominating wholesaler. There are 
historic examples available for this: in the beginning of the 2000s, all long-term elec-
tricity purchase contracts in California were terminated and power stations were 
forced to take their capacities to the stock market; this drastic intervention step did 
result in prices close to the marginal cost. A similar construction cannot be envi-
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sioned given the Hungarian conditions, although many researchers of economic sta-
tistics dream about such a scenario, which would be a close approach of the very rare 
case of controlled experiments in economics.   
Our article primarily focused on the practical calculation of the indicators used to 
measure market power and as intended, it linked mechanical measurement to eco-
nomic analysis to obtain as clear information as possible on the market situation and 
the intensity of market power.  
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